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Foreword
This is the second of our new series of reports that focus on pensions issues of
direct relevance to pensions practitioners, employers, trustees, and policymakers.
The 2004 Pensions Act has turned the defined benefit pension promise into a
pension guarantee and has established the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) in order
to secure this guarantee where a company becomes insolvent and the scheme is
underfunded. The Act has greatly upset corporate pension sponsors, not only
because it has fundamentally altered the voluntary arrangements that these
companies provide for their own workforce, but also because it forces financially
strong companies to subsidise financially weak companies via the PPF levy.
Importantly, it appears that this cross-subsidy relates to jobs as well as pensions.
In addition to these observations, we found that the Act will have a number of
serious unintended consequences. One consequence is that, as a result of conflicts
of interest, company directors increasingly will cease to be members of the trustee
board and that as a result of this disconnection between scheme and sponsor,
many trustee boards will become rudderless. There is no help from the Act in
redressing this situation, but participants in our research suggested a range of
sound governance principles that could be used to address how this two-way
information vacuum may be filled in future. 
A further very significant consequence is that the Act will accelerate the demise of
defined benefit pension provision in the UK private sector and its replacement with
defined contribution schemes in which workers bear all the risks. 
As with our first report Delivering DC? Barriers to participation in the company-
sponsored pensions market, Debbie Harrison and Alistair Byrne have conducted
most of the interviews with practitioners. I am delighted to say that they have been
joined by Bill Rhodes, who not only conducted the remaining interviews, but was
also responsible for raising the sponsorship funding from Pendragon plc, Boots
plc and Rentokil Initial plc. We are very grateful to these companies for their
generous sponsorship, especially since it was given freely and without conditions.
I should stress that the views expressed in the report are those of the authors and
respondents and not necessarily those of the Pensions Institute, which itself takes
no policy position.
Professor David Blake Director, Pensions Institute
October 
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Preface
The implications of the Pensions Act 2004 for UK occupational schemes are now
becoming clearer and in many cases are not consistent with the stated aims of the
government when it drafted this landmark legislation. 
The purpose of this research is to report how employers, trustees, and the many
organisations that provide services to occupational pension schemes are
responding to change, and to look beyond the current tactical positions these
parties are adopting, in order to consider the longer-term impact of the Act on
company-sponsored pensions.
The government introduced the Act to ensure occupational pension schemes are
sufficiently well funded to meet their liabilities in terms of benefits to members. At
present most schemes register a deficit and in a significant minority of cases this 
is large relative to the sponsoring company’s market capitalisation. 
For trustees the Act provides clear guidance on the steps they must take to restore
full solvency under the new Statutory Funding Objective (SFO), which replaces 
the discredited Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) for actuarial valuations 
that occur from October 2005. The Regulator’s guidance introduces a more
confrontational approach to the trustees’ negotiations with sponsoring employers
than has hitherto been the case. 
For employers the Act means that as sponsors they now have significantly reduced
power and control over their pension schemes compared with the legal and
regulatory environment that pertained when they first established these voluntary
arrangements. After 11 June 2003, when the government introduced rules that
prevent solvent employers from walking away from their defined benefit (DB)
pension liabilities without paying the full buy-out cost, pension fund deficits
became legal debts. The Act formalises this reclassification of schemes and states
that these debts are akin to bank loans and trustees akin to bank lenders. What
employers originally established as a voluntary promise has become a legal
guarantee, so long as the sponsor remains solvent. 
We found that employers are deeply concerned and angry about this fundamental
change in the nature of occupational pensions risk, which is affecting the way they
can do business, raise finance, pay dividends, and engage in corporate activity.
They look with longing at competitors who do not have DB schemes but instead
have only ever offered low cost defined contribution (DC) arrangements.
The Act requires trustees to negotiate robustly with the employer to set the period
over which solvency must be achieved and the rate of employer contribution. In
the event that agreement cannot be reached, the Regulator has the power to
intervene. Recovery periods are likely to be fixed at between five and ten years,
with an increasing number of lay and independent trustees favouring the shorter
time frame. This may put a significant restriction on the extent to which companies
are able to pay dividends to their shareholders. 
Our respondents thought that the conflicts that will arise over the time frame for
the recovery period will have important implications for advisers and in particular
for the business model of the actuarial and investment consultants who historically
Pyrrhic Victory? The unintended consequences of the Pensions Act 2004
    
have strongly influenced – some would say controlled – both the corporate and
trusteeship aspects of pension schemes in the UK. This dual role is under scrutiny
and may not be viable in future. As one consultant observed: “It’s very simple. If 
I feel that I am unable to do the job, then it shouldn’t go to one of my colleagues.”
Our research suggests that if the current chain of events continues to its logical
conclusion the Act will succeed in improving the governance of occupational
pension schemes and will enhance the short-term security of members’ pension
benefits, but it will do so at the expense of employer commitment. Many
employers are looking to remove their pension liabilities from their company
balance sheet as quickly as possible and several respondents said they were
working on ways to help corporate clients do this. And so it will be a Pyrrhic victory
for pensions policymakers. As a pensions lawyer succinctly put it to us, “There is no
point in having the best regulation in the world if there are no schemes left to
regulate.”
Many of our respondents believe that as trustees and the Regulator put pressure
on companies to reduce pension scheme deficits over relatively short recovery
periods, companies will respond by closing their schemes to future accrual by
existing members and will shift ongoing pension provision for all employees to 
a DC basis. It is not easy to see what can stop this trend once it takes hold.
The DB schemes of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are likely to be the
first major casualties. This should be cause for concern given that these companies
represent the powerhouse of the UK economy and many will become the larger
plcs of the future. We make specific reference throughout the main research
sections to the position of SMEs under the Act, which is often quite different from
that of larger companies.
Our interviews were conducted with over 70 representatives selected from major
participants in the following groups:
· Actuarial and investment consultants
· Accountants
· Pensions lawyers
· Insurance companies
· Asset managers
· Investment banks
· Company, member-nominated, professional and independent trustees
· Corporate pensions managers 
· Pension scheme members
The most important feature of our methodology is that our findings are based on
interviews with a wide and representative range of organisations, conducted on
the understanding that information provided and opinions expressed would be
quoted on a non-attributable basis. This methodology enables us to “tell it how it
is” and express the personal opinions of senior figures in the industry, rather than
the organisations they represent. Our acknowledgement section reflects only a
selection of the organisations involved. In many cases individuals – particularly
employers – felt that even when quoted anonymously, their comments could be
traced back to the company if the name were included in the Acknowledgments.
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What is particularly significant in the analysis is how many of the most striking
views are consistently held across all of the participating groups, from member
nominated trustee (MNT) to finance director, from pensions lawyer to asset
manager, and from the smaller actuarial and benefits consultancy operating 
in the SME market to the major actuarial and accountancy practice with 
FTSE 100 company clients. 
We hope our approach helps those responsible for the running and supervision 
of DB schemes to understand the early impact of the new legislation and to see
how others are approaching it. Equally we hope that readers will find this report
illuminating in its fresh approach to contemporary pensions problems.
Debbie Harrison
Alistair Byrne
Bill Rhodes
David Blake
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Executive summary
The Pensions Act 2004 introduces a framework for restoring defined benefit
pension scheme solvency over an extremely short recovery period. Our research
suggests that this will risk alienating the voluntary corporate sponsors on which
occupational pensions in the UK rely. It reduces their powers, their control, and
their ability to manage this significant business risk. As the report explains,
employers are angry because they feel that their pension schemes are being used
to achieve social and political objectives in the areas of employment and welfare.
The historic alignment of the interests of trustees and the sponsoring employer is
under threat. Respondents warned that unless trustees and the Pensions Regulator
can structure the recovery process with a clear focus on the long-term implications
of their actions for the financial health of the sponsoring companies, employers
would respond by closing DB schemes to future accrual. 
Our research indicates that in the place of a final salary-linked pension, all but 
a minority of very large companies will introduce contract-based defined
contribution schemes – a trend already well under way. Our findings also suggest
that companies with existing trust-based occupational DC schemes are looking 
to move to a contract basis, reflecting their general weariness with, and their
desire to withdraw from, the complexity of trust-based benefits.
In the light of these findings it seems very likely that in future the main burden of
private pension provision will fall directly on individuals, who are ill equipped to
manage the associated investment and longevity risks. The burden will also fall 
on the taxpayer, who ultimately will be forced to pick up the bill for the increasing
demand for Pension Protection Fund support when employers become insolvent,
and for state retirement benefits when DC arrangements fail to deliver adequate
private pensions.
The government has stated in the past that it aims to shift the balance between
state and private pension provision from 60:40 to 40:60 by the year 2050. 
The most significant unintended consequence of the Pensions Act 2004 is that
measures designed in theory to shore up the occupational pensions sector, in
practice risk undermining it and hastening its demise. This is the Pyrrhic victory 
of our title. 
In the meantime sponsoring employers face a difficult 5-10 year period while they
restore their underfunded DB schemes to solvency. The detrimental impact on
business of the expected trend towards an accelerated recovery process will not 
be limited to isolated cases but is likely to have effects across the economy.
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Key findings
The key findings of this report are set out below. More detail is provided in the
corresponding section of the report.
1. The Act disconnects the historic alignment of the interests of trustees 
and the sponsoring employer
Respondents argued that the legislation significantly raises tensions between
trustees and sponsoring employers, putting at risk their traditional conciliatory
approach to negotiating scheme funding. 
2. Company directors are likely to withdraw from trustee boards
Directors who are trustees could be forced to act in ways that would undermine the
company’s competitive position and the value it is able to deliver to shareholders.
They could also see their performance-related pay suffer as a result of the
fulfilment of trustee responsibilities. However, where company trustees withdraw,
this will exacerbate communication difficulties between the trustee and the
company boards and create governance problems.
3. The new requirements for Trustee Knowledge and Understanding (TKU) 
may alienate older, highly capable trustees
The profile of the traditional trustee, so highly valued by respondents, is an older
worker with a long period of service, who therefore understands the company and
its benefits policy. These are the trustees who have the ability to ask important,
commonsense questions. They are likely to be replaced with younger employees
from middle management.
4. The business model of actuarial and investment consultants is under
scrutiny and is expected to change
Actuarial and investment consultants have built their businesses on a model that
assumes they will advise both the trustees and the sponsoring company. The Act
may make this approach untenable. 
5. Clearance is likely to favour trustees but create problems for employers
The Pension Regulator’s clearance procedures for activities that may weaken the
employer’s covenant appear to be positive for trustees, securing additional
funding in most cases. However, the benefits for employers are far less clear-cut.
Employers appear to have lost their initial enthusiasm and become much more
wary of the perceived interference in the business clearance entails.
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6.There are serious doubts over the longer-term viability of the PPF
While the PPF funding position looks comparatively stable in the short term, it
lacks control over its exposure to the risk of a flood of new entrants in the event 
of adverse economic conditions, while its taxable franchise will diminish over the
longer-term as schemes close to future accrual and wind up.
7. Employers feel they have lost control of their DB schemes and will close 
to future accrual
Respondents fear that employers will lose their commitment to pensions as a result
of the Act and close DB schemes to future accrual. Most will transfer existing
members to DC schemes and these are likely to be predominantly contract rather
than trust-based.
8. To proceed with confidence employers need the flexibility to design benefits
that are appropriate to their size and financial strength
Employers feel that the Pensions Act, in effect, removes much of the flexibility they
need in designing appropriate employee benefits. It raises the risks associated
with DB pension provision to a level that exceeds the perceived benefits.
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The research in detail
In the following pages we set out the results of our focused interviews with
employers, trustees, members, and professional advisers to pension schemes.
We identify the respondents only by category and their responses are in serif.
Section 1: Scheme funding
The Act disconnects the historic alignment of the interests of trustees and the
sponsoring employer, putting at risk their traditional conciliatory approach to
negotiating scheme funding. 
The Act sets out a statutory funding objective (SFO) that pension schemes must
meet and requires schemes to prepare a statement of funding principles (SFP)
designed to meet the SFO. 
The Pensions Regulator’s Code of Practice ‘Funding Defined Benefits’ sets out in
more detail its expectations of the content of the SFP and of the nature of a
scheme’s recovery plan should there be a deficit.
“Trustees should … aim for any shortfall to be eliminated as soon as practicable
since full funding in relation to the technical provisions is the statutory funding
objective. What is possible, however, will be dependent on the financial
circumstances of the employer.” TPR, Funding Defined Benefits, 53.
What the Act says:
222 Statutory Funding Requirement
Every scheme is subject to a requirement – the statutory funding objective – that 
it must have sufficient and appropriate assets to cover its technical provisions.
Technical provisions are defined as the amount required on an actuarial
calculation to make provision for the scheme’s liabilities.
223 Statement of Funding Principles
The trustees must prepare, and from time to time review and if necessary revise, 
a written statement of their policy for securing that the statutory funding objective
is met.
226 Recovery Plan
If having obtained an actuarial valuation it appears to the trustees of a scheme
that the statutory funding objective was not met on the effective date of the
valuation, they must within a prescribed timescale prepare a recovery plan if none
is in place, or review and if necessary revise any recovery plan already in force.
The recovery plan must set out the steps to be taken to meet the statutory funding
objective and the period within which that is to be achieved.
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1.1 The Act establishes an adversarial relationship between trustees and sponsor
Almost all respondents held the view that the new requirements create a more
adversarial relationship between trustees and corporate sponsors in terms of
negotiating funding of the scheme. The exceptions were certain advisers and
independent trustees with FTSE100 clients, where the trustee board governance
was particularly well developed and/or where the deficit was not large relative 
to market capitalisation. 
Trust law is specifically designed to manage conflicts and has done so in the past
with considerable success. Respondents felt that the Act fails to recognise that the
interests of trustees (as employees and scheme beneficiaries) and the sponsor in
most cases are well aligned. This historical basis for the operation of occupational
schemes has changed beyond recognition.
“The 1995 Act also recognises this conflict and trust law has done so for
hundreds of years.Conflict is good – it gets different views out on the table
and stimulates discussion.The issue has always been to spot when a conflict
becomes unmanageable.What has changed though is that the new Act appears
to positively encourage conflict rather than conciliation.The Regulator is
encouraging trustees to take an aggressive and confrontational approach in
negotiations with the company.” Pensions lawyer
“The cosy relationship between trustees and employers has ended.Trustees are
finding out that there should never have been one in the first place.” Accountant
“The 2004 Act codifies conflict.” Asset manager
“It’s the situation companies and trustees face that is causing the conflict.
We have a situation that has no real precedent – with schemes significantly
underfunded and companies in a relatively weak position.” Consultant
1.2 Funding:Conflicts of interest
We asked how companies and trustees would negotiate over the Statutory Funding
Objective (SFO) and Statement of Funding Principles (SFP). Most respondents
thought the Act redefined the relationship between trustees and corporate
sponsors when it came to negotiating funding:
“The government has laid down in great detail the process trustees are
required to follow in setting the SFP and the schedule of contributions.This 
is much more intrusive regulation than we have had before. In some cases, it
will change the dynamic between the company and the trustees, creating
conflicts.” Trustee
“The financial relationship between the company and trustees must be
redefined.The biggest debate will be over the recovery period. For a company
rated B- it makes no sense to use a recovery period of longer than five years
because the ratings say that the company has an over 40% chance of not being
in existence in five years time. In these circumstances it’s a joke to talk about 
a recovery period of 10-15 years – it fails the sanity test.The trustees’ priority
must be to negotiate contributions over the next few years.” Consultant
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“Trustees need to negotiate like a bank that has agreed a loan to the company.
They should insist on being informed if the company wants to take certain
corporate actions.They should impose constraints and conditions.They need
the finance director to provide an information flow – to present the insider’s
view of the company’s prospects and its ability to meet the funding schedule.
Trustees can effectively force the company because they can go to the
Regulator.” Consultant
1.3 Prudential use of trustee powers
There was concern amongst some respondents as to whether trustees would use
their new powers prudently. Effectively trustees have the power to push a company
into insolvency if they can demonstrate that this is in the best interests of the
pension scheme. The Regulator can back them in this approach.
“Trustees need to recognise the business strains that will arise if they insist on 
a very tough recovery schedule.Trustees need to understand corporate
structures and corporate financing.This has not been a traditional area of
trustee knowledge.” Accountant
“Member security will be eroded if trustees push for a high company
contribution rate that, if it does not force the company into insolvency,may
well reduce the company’s competitive position and weaken its financial
strength.” Consultant
“Trustees are likely to push for recovery periods of 5-10 years. Five years
would be scary – it would push the company into insolvency or damage it
irreparably.One of my clients has already had to agree to pay 80% of its profits
to the scheme.The trustees – and possibly the Regulator – will have to spread
that out, otherwise the company will go bust.” Consultant to SMEs
1.4 Solvency issues
The precise definition of solvency was an issue for some respondents and most felt
that the use of different measures – SFO (which takes effect for valuations from
October 2005), the buy-out basis, and the PPF solvency level (which takes effect
on 31 December 2006) – merely adds to the confusion already created by the
move to the FRS 17 accounting measure and the new international standard,
IAS19. The clearest and cleanest measure is the full buy out cost, as this is the only
way a company can discharge its liabilities in full, through the purchase of
immediate and deferred annuities. However, the adoption of the buy-out funding
level is not practicable for most companies at present, due to cost and insufficient
capacity in the buy-out market. Currently only two players are active in the open
market – Legal & General and Prudential.
“The PPF solvency test will be regarded as the main priority and this is less
than full solvency.We need a single measure of solvency against the full buy-
out – everything else is a waste of time and adds to the confusion. SFO
encourages a target that is not sufficient.The buy-out capability is what really
counts.” Consultant
“We think of the buy-out cost as the gold standard for DB schemes, as
following June 2003 solvent employers cannot shift DB liabilities off their
books unless they take this route.But what is the right cost of a buy out if
there is no market?” Consultant
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“There is now a requirement for actuaries to include [the buy out cost]
amongst the information they provide to trustees.Trustees can still choose to
use an alternative basis of funding, but they can no longer claim to be unaware
of the buy out cost.” Insurance company
“There is also going to be hard disclosure to members from April 2006,with
the benefits statement showing the solvency coverage of their own individual
benefits. For active members this might amount to only 30% to 40% of
accrued benefits,which is going to provoke some interesting conversations.”
Insurance company
1.5 Asset allocation:More bonds?
We asked whether trustees would change asset allocations as a result of the Act.
Most respondents thought the trend to greater bond allocations was already well
under way prior to the Act and that, if anything, the Act simply reinforced that
trend.
“We will not see much change as a direct result of the Act – most schemes
have already moved to a more cautious asset allocation.” Consultant
“The gradual transition to bonds will be driven by maturity and schemes will
mature automatically as they close to new members and to future accrual.”
Consultant
“Employers will plug the hole and then invest in whatever will ensure the
situation will never arise again.This isn’t just about a traditional equity to bond
switch – it’s about using new financial instruments that can guarantee a
liability match.” Accountant
“Once the PPF starts to take the investment strategy of the fund into account
when it sets the levy, schemes will move to a higher bond weighting.” Consultant
“The idea of bond investing does seem to be more widely accepted.Most of
the big asset managers have liability-driven investing teams and the proponents
of bond investing are not as isolated in the actuarial profession as they once
were.” Investment bank
1.6 Is the trend towards bonds misguided?
However, some respondents thought the drive towards bonds was misguided and
that with a long time horizon, most funds could continue to afford to take equity
risk. In due course the PPF will take account of asset allocation in setting the 
(80%) risk-based element of the levy. If it favours a higher bond weighting as the
more secure approach to matching liabilities this is likely to increase pressure on
schemes to move from equities.
“The strength of pension fund investment has always been based on the fact
that they can take long term risks. Legislation is driving the trend towards
liability-matching strategies that in most cases introduce a higher bond
weighting. Finance directors might be forced to agree to this, as they put
themselves personally at risk if they push for a higher equity allocation and it
backfires. Personal risk is clouding the investment strategy for both trustees
and the company.” Asset manager
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“Allocations have already changed due to actuarial advice, legislation and
accounting regulations.The legislation is now going to drive the allocations –
not the needs of the scheme.The drive towards bonds is just another herd
instinct and there will be a backlash next time inflation starts to rise.”
Pensions lawyer
1.7 Trustees need to protect against weak employer covenants
Trustees need to understand much more clearly the strength of the covenant they
have from the sponsoring employer. The strength of this covenant will depend 
on the company’s ability to pay the required contributions, which in turn reflects 
its financial position. Put simply, if the company has a strong balance sheet and is
making healthy profits, this implies a strong covenant; a weak balance sheet and
poor profit forecasts implies the reverse.
The Pensions Regulator’s guidance makes specific reference to the requirement 
for the length of the recovery plan to take into account “the ability of the employer
to pay contributions in accordance with the recovery plan.” (TPR, Funding Defined
Benefits, 58) There is a difficult balance to be struck.
“Trustees need to review the strength of the covenant and the position of the
scheme as an unsecured creditor in the event of insolvency.” Accountant
“Understanding the covenant is not the trustees’main area of knowledge and
in fact the trustees who are likely to be most knowledgeable are the company
representatives,who are in a position of conflict.The situation requires
specialist advice from an insolvency practitioner and knowledge about the
company that is not available in the marketplace,which could be expensive 
to obtain.” Pensions manager
“The biggest issue is the strength of the employer’s covenant, as this will
dictate the period over which the trustees should aim to collect the deficit
money. In theory the poorer the covenant the faster the recovery schedule,
but this could actually push the employer into insolvency,which would be
counter-productive.” Pensions manager
“An important question is in which circumstances the trustees should be
pushing for the highest contribution rate – when the employer is strong or
when it is weak? You can argue it both ways, particularly where schemes have
large numbers of active members who will be concerned about the impact on
jobs.” Insurance company
“Where the employer asks the trustees to rely partly on equity investments to
fund the deficit, trustees need to find out whether the employer has the ability
to pay the contributions if the equity market does not deliver.” Accountant
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1.8 Contingent funding strategies
One option available for trustees is to look to improve the security of their claim 
on the employer, for example by taking a charge on specific assets. Contingent
funding strategies could also be used. In essence, these are arrangements that
enable the trustees to obtain insurance that pays out in the event the employer 
is unable to meet its funding obligations. This could take the form of a bank
guarantee or some type of credit derivative. However, it remains to be seen
whether the PPF will accept such arrangements in calculating the scheme’s
funding level when assessing the risk based levy.
“Trustees need more instruments to protect against credit risk.Their
investment consultants need more education on credit default swaps, for
example, and how to include these in the asset-liability model.” Investment bank
“For each trustee action on asset allocation there will be a corresponding
reaction in the level of employer contribution.Employers may look to non-
cash strategies as a way to avoid higher contributions and the potential ‘loss’
of a future surplus.” Consultant
Section 2: Trustee conflicts of interest 
Company directors are likely to withdraw from the trustee board to avoid
conflicts of interest. Alternative mechanisms are required to ensure a smooth
flow of information between the company and the trustees 
Almost all respondents thought that company directors serving as trustees faced
potential conflicts of interest. A minority thought the potential conflicts were a price
worth paying for the knowledge and insight into the company’s views that they
brought to the trustee group.
“Finance directors and HR directors bring considerable knowledge and
experience to the board. If they go there is a knowledge gap and also a
concern that the company is keeping at arms length from the board and not
revealing its agenda.” Trustee
“I’d rather have the trustees evenly represented and let them fight it out, even
if this leads to uncomfortable situations” Trustee
“In some cases the company board has written the to the HR director,who 
is a trustee, and said ‘We recognise that your principal responsibility is to the
trustee board and that you are at liberty to disclose any material information.
We also recognise that in this situation your position as a company director
may be constrained.’” Consultant
2.1 Majority see era of company trustee drawing to a close
However, the vast majority of respondents anticipated that the era in which
company directors could serve on trustee boards is coming to an end, particularly
in the case of finance directors, managing directors and chief executive officers. 
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Our research indicates it is the perception of conflict rather than the practical
management of this fundamental feature of trusteeship that will force finance
directors and chief executive officers, and other senior directors, off the trustee
board. With pensions in the news headlines on a daily basis and with strong union
activity in this area, high profile companies in particular need to appear to be
following best practice on trustee and corporate governance. 
Opinion was divided over whether resignations would be pre-emptive, for
example as a matter of company policy before the next actuarial valuation (which
is the trigger point for the SFO and the recovery plan) or whether an application
for clearance would be the trigger. 
Without exception respondents said that the loss of company directors would
significantly reduce the skill set of the trustee board, and would damage the
information flow and the trustees’ understanding of the company context and
perspective.
“I have difficulty seeing how an FD can be a trustee without coming across
conflicts of interest.At every turn there is a potential conflict.” Insurance company
“[The idea of company directors serving as trustees] has got to be on the way
out.You can just about get away with it when nothing is happening, but if
there are any issues over funding it is not sustainable.” Investment bank
“The requirement to negotiate with the employer is not that simple for
member nominated trustees. It is, of course, even worse if you are an executive.
In effect you have to act in a way deliberately designed to redistribute
corporate wealth towards the pension scheme.This could have the impact of
lowering shareholder value, reducing the chance of a company meeting its key
performance indicators.These are usually the very key performance indicators
that executives are measured on determining ultimately how much they get
paid and if they get promoted or vilified by investors. Executives who are
trustees could therefore be required to act in a way that would reduce their
own pay. If this is not a conflict of interests then what is?” Accountant
“Company executives bring important financial knowledge to the trustee
board.However, in practice many will find it increasingly difficult to stay on
the board.A few years ago FDs were worried about whether they should act 
as chairman of the trustee board – and this is now quite rare.Now they are
wondering if they should be on the board at all.” Investment bank
“In theory company trustees bring essential expertise and a sense of direction
to the trustee board. In practice it’s getting very difficult for the FD to remain
as a trustee.Understandably it’s hard to justify the dual role.Trustee boards will
be the weaker for the loss.” Pensions lawyer
“In practice company trustees are resigning or considering this step.This is a
sad loss – it’s their scheme too, it’s their company and they bring the expertise
the Pensions Regulator demands.” Consultant
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2.2 New governance arrangements required in the absence of company trustees
The Act provides no guidance on pension scheme governance in the event 
of company directors resigning from the trustee board. The loss of company
executives as trustees will require new governance structures that ensure the
continuation of a two-way flow of information between the company board 
and the trustees. 
“I’ve seen schemes where there is no senior company trustee and they behave
as though they are rudderless – there’s no sense of direction without the
company position and where the scheme fits in with the company’s future.”
Consultant to SMEs
“This is the key question – if company trustees withdraw the trustees still
need the commercial knowledge.” Accountant
“There is no system to deal with this. In practice company directors will have
to inform trustees about notifiable events but that’s it.However the company
will need to keep contact with the trustees to see what direction they are
taking.There is a mutual need for information here and without company
directors on the trustee board there is no mechanism to deal with this vital
requirement.” Pensions lawyer
2.3 Trustees and their ‘cheque book’ still need to communicate
Several respondents suggested that board members would still need to attend
trustee meetings even if they were no longer trustees.
“There needs to be a close relationship between the trustees and the employer.
They need to understand each other.There is no point in the trustees taking 
a totally theoretical, distanced view.They are more than just an unsecured
creditor.They need to work with the company.There should be some kind of
formal arrangement for trustees and the company to interact.” Pensions manager
“A reasonable compromise might be where the company executives attend
meetings as ‘visitors’.” Trustee
“If I were the finance director I would not want to be a trustee but I would
demand a seat at the table. I’m the cheque book and my main concern is the
governance of the board and risk control from the company’s perspective.”
Asset manager
“One model is for a subgroup to be set up with representatives of the trustees
and of the employer.The subgroup will discuss any issues that will affect the
employer covenant and will take a view as to whether it needs to be notified
to the trustees. In effect, it acts like a filter.” Insurance Company
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2.4 The FTSE 100 experience
We asked pensions managers at 20 FTSE 100 companies about the role of
company executives in relation to their scheme’s trustee board. There were mixed
views about how best to deal with the potential conflicts of interest while still
ensuring good flows of information between the trustees and the company.
· All 20 pensions managers were aware of the potential conflict in having 
company executives on the trustee board
· Seven of the 20 said that main board directors did serve on the trustee board
· A further four said that the HR director was on the trustee board, but he or she 
was not a main board director
· In the remaining nine companies, company directors did not serve on the 
trustee board
· Where directors serve as trustees it was argued that the knowledge they bring 
to the trustee board outweighed any potential conflict
· Where directors did not serve on the trustee board, arrangements were in place 
to ensure there was a continued dialogue between the company and the trustees 
· In some cases a sub-committee of the parent company board was charged with 
the task of negotiating with the trustees, while in others the FD or the HR director 
would be in attendance at the trustee board or the sub-committee meeting, 
although not in the formal role of a trustee
· Eight of the 20 pensions managers noted that their scheme had independent 
trustees as members of the trustee board or serving as chairman
2.5 Trustee board governance issues for SMEs
Smaller companies face particular problems in finding people outside the board
who have the necessary knowledge and ability to be trustees.
“It is not uncommon in small organisations for management to take on
multiple roles. It could be that the senior management are the only people
qualified to weigh up and make decisions based on complex financial matters.
The company may simply not be able to afford the training costs for other
employees to be prepared to take on such a role.” Consultant to SMEs
“We haven’t reached the point where FDs shouldn’t be there – but company
trustees must know when it’s time to stand down.This will be particularly
difficult for SMEs,where the FD drives the trustee board.” Consultant
2.6 Independent trustees: Increasing demand? 
Many schemes already use professional or independent trustees. Strictly speaking
these are different roles, although the terms tended to be used interchangeably by
respondents. Professional trustees may have an interest in the scheme, for
example they may do other work elsewhere for the company or they may be ex-
employees who are also scheme members. The Pensions Management Institute
describes independent trustees as: 
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“An individual or corporate body with no direct or indirect involvement with the
pension scheme, employer or members, other than performing the duties of the
trustee.” PMI, www.pensions-pmi.org.uk/trustees
In theory, as conflict becomes more common, independent trustees will be in
increasing demand, but most respondents, including the independents
themselves, said that their skills and expertise could not replace the company
knowledge of company directors and MNTs. Overall, two thirds of respondents felt
there would be a greater need for independent trustees but, separately, about half
said they were concerned about the loss of the company’s control of the pension
scheme and the additional costs incurred. 
“There is a growing need for professionals in the light of the withdrawal of
company trustees and falling interest in MNTs.” Investment bank
“A good board would be a mix of professional and non-professional trustees.
The professional trustee should not dominate the board.” Consultant to SMEs
“Some employers don’t want more professionals and they shouldn’t be seen as
an alternative to replace MNTs. It can lead to loss of control for the company.”
Consultant
2.7 Cost of independent trustees an issue
Cost is an important consideration in the decision to hire independent trustees,
especially for smaller firms.
“To force schemes to employ independent trustees would be an added
expense without necessarily adding any value.” Pensions lawyer
“The problem is that the professional might say to a small scheme that the cost
will be £5000 a year but will then insist on doing an audit and may bring in a
lawyer – and before you know it the scheme has got a bill for £30,000 for
sorting out quite minor points.That doesn’t help the scheme move forwards
and it’s £30k that could have gone into the scheme.” Consultant to SMEs
“Ironically it’s the SMEs that would benefit most because of the likelihood of
governance problems – the boards are far less formal than in larger companies.
The only way independent trustees might work [from the cost perspective] is
if the appointment led to a direct reduction in the PPF levy, for example.”
Consultant to SMEs
2.8 Quality of independent trusteeship questioned
There were also concerns about the quality of independent trustees and their
ability to recommend controversial decisions without exposing themselves to
criticism and blame.
“Some of the big firms of independent trustees I’ve seen in action are a
disgrace. Forever double dipping – taking fees from the scheme but not taking
real responsibility.Their priority is protecting themselves.They may find life
less comfortable in future.” Pensions lawyer
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“Independent trustees need to be more creative and to reconsider their
business model.” Asset manager
“If the proverbial hits the fan the professional trustee is first in the firing line.
They are going to need deep-pocket insurers.” Pensions lawyer
Section 3: Trustee knowledge and understanding 
The new requirements for Trustee Knowledge and Understanding (TKU) may
alienate older, highly capable trustees who have the ability to ask important,
commonsense questions. Furthermore, many respondents think the target 
of having 50% member-nominated trustees is unworkable and undesirable.
The Act reinforces the requirements for one third of trustees in each scheme to be
nominated by members and creates powers for the Secretary of State to increase
the required proportion to one half at some future date. Furthermore, the Act sets
out a number of areas relating to their own scheme and pensions matters in
general with which all trustees must be familiar. The Regulator’s Code of Practice
on TKU sets out 13 areas it expects trustees to be conversant with.
What the Act says:
241 Requirement for member-nominated trustees
The trustees of an occupational pension scheme must secure that arrangements
are in place that provide for at least one third of the total number of trustees to be
member-nominated trustees.
243 Member-nominated trustees: supplementary
The Secretary of State may, by order, amend section 241 to require that at least
one half of the total number of trustees be member-nominated trustees.
247 Requirement for knowledge and understanding: individual trustees
An individual who is a trustee of an occupational pension scheme must be
conversant with:
· the trust deed and rules of the scheme
· the statement of investment principles
· the statement of funding principles
· any other document recording policy for administration of the scheme
An individual who is a trustee must have knowledge and understanding of:
· the law relating to pensions and trusts
· the principles relating to the funding of occupational pension schemes
· the principles relating to investment of pension scheme assets
The degree of knowledge and understanding required is that appropriate 
to enable the individual properly to exercise his functions as a trustee of any
relevant scheme.
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3.1 Middle managers to replace older,more experienced trustees
Almost all respondents support the continued role of the lay trustee. Only a few felt
that the days of the amateur should be over. However, most respondents were
concerned that the nature of lay trusteeship would change under the Act and that
TKU would, over time, force out older trustees who do not have A-level or
university education, and encourage middle managers to take their place. This
would weaken the diversity of the trustee board as a whole.
All respondents thought that the most important role of the lay trustee is to ask
searching questions of the professional advisers to which the trustee board
delegates the management of the scheme assets. The Pensions Management
Institute puts it this way:
‘Trustees are not, however, specialists in any area of pensions management – the
effective trustee will have a broad general knowledge and will be able to ask the
right questions of the many professionals engaged in the efficient running of
pension funds.’ www.pensions-pmi.org.uk/trustees
3.2 Amateur trustees:Highly valued
There was widespread positive comment on the contribution from lay trustees.
“Amateurs do a fantastic job.” Pensions lawyer
“In my experience the idea of amateur trustees does work. If you have the
right individuals who are enthusiastic, their amateur status keeps them just
distant enough to ask the obvious questions and cut through the jargon.”
Pensions manager
“Lay trustees make commonsense decisions and ask commonsense questions.
They also understand the company ethos and this is important where they
must make discretionary payments on early retirement and ill health.They can
reflect the company’s benevolent attitude or whatever this attitude might be.
Without lay trustees we don’t get a feeling for how the whole organisation
runs itself.” Trustee
“Lay trustees who work for the company add an enormous value to the
trustee board.They are not supposed to be managers; they are directors, like
non-executive directors – of the trust.Their job is to delegate tasks or to
outsource the work and receive reports.” Trustee
“What concerns me is that TKU is using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.The
role of the enthusiastic amateur has a lot going for it. Some of the most
effective trustees I have experience of have been the workers’ representatives in
an industrial company – shop floor workers.They were not financially
educated, but they were quick to learn.The most testing questions came from
these people and it would be a shame if they were excluded from the process.”
Trustee
“Member nominated trustees use a high degree of commonsense and ask the
important, often awkward, questions.Moreover they have a vested interest in
the scheme.What lies ahead is Blairism in pensions – decisions are being taken
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away from anyone who is classed as a non-expert, even if they are experienced
employees who understand the company.We need to maintain democracy in
pension decision making.” Asset manager
3.3 Meeting required standards
On the other hand, a few respondents were less sure of the ongoing role of MNTs
in the light of the Act’s requirement for trustees to behave in a more businesslike,
expert manner.
“We have to question the role of amateurs on a board that the Regulator
expects to be run as a corporate entity with control, risk management, and
accountability.” Accountant
“Democracy is a wonderful thing, but if you are looking for people to serve
on the board of a complex financial organisation, you need them to have
certain characteristics.Democracy may not produce these characteristics,
especially in non-financial companies.” Trustee
3.4 TKU to drive choice of trustees
The changing legal requirements are highly significant and respondents felt it was
imperative that MNTs fully understand their responsibilities.
“There is still a role for [amateur] trustees but they should not take on the role
lightly.Along with much greater power is much greater responsibility.”
Investment bank
“Amateur trustees still perform a vital role.But they really do need to
understand the advice they receive and act on.” Consultant
“The enthusiastic amateur is being replaced with the educated amateur – it
will change the nature of the lay trustee moving the job up the management
scale.MNTs increasingly will be drawn from middle management.” Consultant 
“Some,who bring the traditional common sense expected of an amateur
trustee, do not have the interest in learning about pensions law and
investment,while others simply don’t have the aptitude.” Consultant to SMEs
3.5 One third MNTs sufficient
Without exception respondents thought that the requirement for one third of
trustees to be member-nominated was adequate and that to go further would 
be unrealistic and would serve no clear purpose. 
There were questions about where an adequate supply of competent trustees
would come from. Initially we assumed that this would mainly affect SMEs.
However, the majority of the FTSE 100 pensions managers we interviewed also
said that it was already difficult to fill MNT places, although some said they had
found no problem at all. All of the pensions managers agreed that it was likely to
become more difficult to fill these places as the responsibilities and knowledge
requirements are increased.
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Some respondents also raised concern over the difficult position of MNTs in
conflict situations where they had to oppose more senior members of the
company. While this has always been an issue, the deficit recovery process will
exacerbate these relationship problems.
“It’s time we recognised that trustee boards do not behave like the textbook
rational investor.MNTs sitting opposite their boss will be very worried
because they will fear that if they make difficult demands about employer
contributions they will mark their cards in terms of future promotion.”
Investment bank
Scheme members were also aware of this problem:
“You’ve got to have a strong person in there.They have to be prepared to put
their head above the parapet.” DB scheme member
“The company representative could be the employee representative’s boss.”
DB scheme member
The employees we spoke to could see the benefit of having some MNTs, but not
too many. They were keen to see that “experts” were overseeing their funds.
“I would have thought the best people to make these decisions are specialists
in the field.” DC scheme member
“I think 50% is too many. It’s good to have representatives to hold people
accountable, but the balance should be experts.” DC scheme member
3.6 Trade union trustees:A useful source of MNTs 
The knowledge of union-trained trustees was highly rated by the majority of
respondents. The TUC has trained over 1,000 members for their role as MNTs 
and provides both initial and ongoing training. More detail is available at
www.tuc.org.uk/trusteenetwork
“There is a growing recognition of the role union-trained trustees can fulfil.”
Investment bank
“Union representatives probably can’t be regarded as impartial, but there is an
explicit acknowledgement now that no member of the trustee board is likely
to be impartial.” Investment bank
“Union MNTs generally do not rock the boat – they know that jobs are on
the other side of the pensions coin.” Consultant
“In my experience when a union trustee joins the board he or she quickly
discovers just how difficult the employer’s position is and how complex the
role of trustee is. It is helpful for the union to understand the dilemmas the
employer faces.” Pensions lawyer
“MNTs often come from unions which run good training courses and
therefore are a useful addition to the board.But in general there is a marked
decline in interest from members.” Consultant to SMEs
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3.7 Will TKU be counter-productive?
The vast majority of respondents regarded the TKU requirements as stretching for
lay trustees. Many worried that the requirements would be counterproductive by
deterring otherwise capable employees from the trustee role.
“The schedule of areas where trustees are expected to be knowledgeable is a
very formidable list.How on earth can they expect the ordinary trustee to get
to grips with all this – it’s unrealistic?” Trustee
“TKU has been likened to an A level – it’s a lot of work for someone who 
may not be professional and has a full time job.Many trustees are in their 50s
and won’t have studied for decades – in fact many left school at 15 or 16.”
Consultant to SMEs
“TKU is tough and may have the opposite effect to the government’s
intention. It is important to distinguish between competence – which can be
measured in qualifications - and capability – which relates to experience.
Capability is the more important factor. In most larger companies the MNTs
tend to be the older employees,who may lack a prolonged formal education
and who will find the prospect of taking A-level trusteeship daunting.They
will leave in droves. In their place,where employees do volunteer,we will see
younger,‘better educated’ employees from middle management. In ten years
time trustee boards will be strong on competence and weak on capability.
Pension schemes need the 45-65 year olds.” Asset manager
“The problem will get worse as trustees need to get to grips with more
complex instruments such as letters of credit, credit default swaps etc.Even
their advisers have problems with these.” Investment bank
Furthermore, the problems with TKU weren’t thought to be confined to MNTs. 
One respondent doubted whether company-nominated trustees would be able 
to find the time to meet the requirements.
“Busy directors and senior managers simply won’t have the time to learn
about all the issues they are required to be familiar with.You will have to go
down into the company to find people who have the time to learn what is
now required, but those people may be less able and will certainly be less
influential and have less clout.” Trustee
3.8 TKU should be at board rather than individual level
Many argued that the requirement for all trustees to have the specified knowledge
was misguided. The key issue is the skill set of the trustee board as a whole, and
this requires a wide range of experience, qualifications, and personalities.
“Why should there be such a distinction between the trustee board and the
company board? Company directors don’t have to demonstrate a specific level
of knowledge and understanding – they don’t have to go on training courses.
Trustees bring common sense to the table not investment expertise.With good
advisers this works.” Pensions lawyer
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“There is a contrast between the arrangements for a corporate board – where
the board has to have the required skills as a corporate body – and the
requirements of these regulations where every individual [trustee] is expected
to have the knowledge to a certain level.” Trustee
“The trustee board is like a company board – it is comprised of a range of
individuals with diverse skills and it is the sum of these diverse skills that makes
the board work.TKU should apply to the trustee board as a whole rather than
to individuals.” Asset manager
“On the board there should be a range of skills – there is no sense in them all
having the same skills.Good governance calls for diversity.On a company
board nobody expects the sales director to be an accountant.” Trustee
Some respondents doubted the practical impact of the requirements.
“Trustees will continue to rely on their actuaries with or without TKU –
probably too much reliance in fact. If you are a non-professional employee it is
easy to be overawed by someone who is articulate and speaks a technical
language.” Consultant to SMEs
“It will work well enough as long as it’s not overly policed. It’s similar to juries
– if we only have experts then we remove plain common sense from the
judgment and that would be a terrible loss.” Pensions lawyer
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Section 4: Actuarial advice 
The business model of actuarial and investment consultants is under scrutiny
and expected to change. They have built their businesses on a model that
assumes they will advise both the trustees and the sponsoring company. The
Act may make this approach untenable. 
The Act raises important questions for the sponsoring company and the trustees in
the use of actuarial and investment advice in conflict situations – most notably the
recovery period strategy. The sponsor and the trustees may have very different
views on the employer contribution level and the asset allocation of the fund.
Trustees are likely to demand greater security in the form of high employer
contributions and a more conservative asset allocation, whereas sponsors may
prefer the reverse. 
What the Code of Practice says:
The Pensions Regulator’s Code of Practice on Funding Defined Benefits (22)
provides guidance on the issue of advice for the employer. It offers three options:
· The scheme actuary provides a calculation service for the employer, with all 
calculations and advice copied to the trustees. In this case the actuary cannot 
recommend different things to each party, which puts a constraint on the trustees.
· A colleague of the scheme actuary provides advice to the employer based on 
calculations done by the scheme actuary. In this case the calculations should be 
provided to the trustees, but the advice need not.
· An actuary from another firm is appointed to give advice to the employer based 
on calculations done by the scheme actuary. In this case the calculations should 
be provided to the trustees, but the advice need not.
4.1 Regulatory guidance needed on adviser’s position 
It will come as no surprise to learn that respondents had very different points of
view over the appropriate response to the potential conflicts of interest. Some
respondents thought it was possible to continue with a single firm as long as care
was taken and separation of advice put in place when there were signs of conflict.
However, this approach hinges on individual consultants being able to decide the
precise point at which separate firms must be used. Most felt that the Regulator
should provide clearer guidance on what is and is not acceptable.
“This is getting much more difficult. In the past advisers have spotted conflicts
and taken action – now they have to spot potential conflicts far sooner and
that’s going to be tough.” Pensions lawyer
“At the moment they clearly can and do [share advisers] – we need an
indication from the Regulator on what is acceptable and what is
unacceptable.” Consultant
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“Trustees and the company are usually happy to share factual information on
the assumptions used and the impact these have on the recovery period.Both
parties can ask the adviser to prepare figures based on different assumptions
and different recovery periods.Confidential advice is relevant in the
interpretation of these facts and in the recommendations, conclusions and
tactics each party might adopt.” Consultant
“A lot of employers are saying they will continue to use the same firm of
actuaries, but what they want is number crunching rather than advice. If there
is a point of conflict and they require advice, they will go to another firm.”
Insurance company
“The scheme actuary can provide all the data – the company can use a
separate actuary to act on this data and ask the scheme actuary relevant
questions.” Trustee
4.2 Serious conflict requires separate advisers – but what is ‘serious’?
While the basic actuarial data can be shared, all respondents agreed that in 
very serious conflicts the trustees and company would need separate advice. 
“The era of trustee and plan-sponsor conversations about funding and
investment being brokered by the trustee’s adviser is coming to an end.”
Consultant
“There needs to be a clear separation of advisers for deficit issues.” Investment
bank
“Lawyers are appalled that the same advisers can act for both sides.Actuaries
are perpetuating a situation that will create conflicts because they want to hang
on to the business.” Accountant
“The decision to use separate advisers in certain circumstances is not
confrontational – it’s good practice.An adviser can’t act in your best interests as
well if the firm is acting for both sides, as it can if it is just representing your
position.There are certain situations were it is impossible for an adviser to
represent both sides.” Trustee
4.3 Separate firms or Chinese walls?
Opinion was divided, however, as to how separate advice could be delivered –
whether this would require separate firms or could be dealt with by different
partners in the same firm. Over half of respondents – including some of the
consultants themselves – said that attempts to create Chinese walls are likely to
backfire. 
“It’s very simple. If I feel that I am unable to do the job, then it shouldn’t go to
one of my colleagues.” Consultant
“It is impossible to establish effective Chinese walls.” Investment bank
“The company and trustees should have separate advisers if there is a deficit.
Chinese walls don’t work – you need separate firms, otherwise the advisers are
setting themselves up for a fall.Two actuaries from the same firm working for
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different parties only have to be seen out drinking together and the walls
disappear.” Accountant
“In some cases the company is using a separate actuary for everything – but 
it is important to avoid extra costs. In the case of sensitive issues the company
must use a separate firm – it is no good going to a different partner in the 
same firm.” Trustee
In cases where advice from separate firms is necessary, respondents said that the
existing actuarial firm should continue to serve the trustees and that it would be 
the corporate sponsor who would seek a separate view. 
Conflicts of interest in the legal, accounting and actuarial professions
The accounting, legal and actuarial profession all have codes of conduct that
outline how members and member firms should deal with actual and potential
conflicts of interest.
The Law Society’s Code of Conduct states that law firms should not act if there is 
a conflict of interests which it defines as the case where “you owe separate duties
to act in the best interests of two or more clients in relation to the same or related
matters and those duties conflict, or there is a significant risk that those duties may
conflict.”
The Auditing Practices Board notes the existence of a “self interest threat” to
objectivity where the firm has economic dependence on a client. In particular
“where substantial fees are regularly generated from the provision of non-audit
services, and the fees from non-audit services are significantly greater than the
annual audit fee, the audit firm has regard to the possibility that there may be
perceived to be a loss of independence.” The provision of non-audit services to
audit clients has declined substantially in recent years in light of this potential
conflict.
Some respondents thought that a ‘self interest threat’ could arise from an actuarial
firm obtaining greater fees from the corporate sponsor than from the trustees.
“Part of it [the issue of separate advisers] comes down to money, even if
different partners are involved. If the trustees are paying £30,000 for basic
actuarial advice and the company is paying the same firm £500,000 for full
pensions accounting, the firm’s interests are clear.” Pensions manager
The Actuarial Profession’s Professional Conduct Standards give guidance on
conflicts of interest. 
“If there is or might appear to be a conflict of interest between two or more clients
of a member or of the member’s firm, or a conflict between a client and the
member or the member’s firm, the member must consider the nature and extent 
of the conflict and whether it is such as to make it improper for the member to give
advice to one or more of the clients involved in the conflict.”
The standard requires any conflict to be disclosed when advice is given to a client
and for the member to not disclose within his or her firm any information he or she
has reason to believe may harm the interests of a client.
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4.4 Cost of separate advisers: issues for SMEs 
Most respondents said that the best practice of using separate advisers unravels
when it comes to smaller companies, which are likely to stick to a single adviser
due to cost rather than desire.
“The big schemes can afford two actuaries, but the smaller ones can’t.The cost
will be much higher than just two separate actuarial fees because the actuaries
will have to negotiate with each other – it will become defensive actuarial
work.” Pensions lawyer
“For SMEs most of the advice should be shared.They simply can’t afford a
separate adviser and it’s better that one actuary does all the work – it provides
more joined up thinking.” Consultant to SMEs
“There isn’t a cost-effective way for SMEs to pay for two advisers.They find it
hard enough to pay for one actuary, let alone the PPF levy and a second
actuary. In practice directors of SMEs won’t bother getting separate actuarial
advice and will try to argue their own corner.” Consultant
“The trend [towards separate advisers] will be less marked for smaller
employers – they’ll simply take less notice of the Act.” Trustee
4.5 Trustees and asset managers:A closer dialogue in future
Most respondents said that the actuarial and investment consultants generally did
a good job. However, outside of the consultancy sector many providers of services
to pension funds felt that the near-monopoly consultants have over investment
strategy and the appointment of asset managers is likely to be eroded. The greater
pressure on trustees to understand and engage with complex investment strategies
in future may make them bolder in questioning their investment adviser and in
talking directly to banks and asset managers. Understandable the most vocal
respondents in this section are asset managers but a minority of consultants
openly acknowledged that they expect a closer dialogue between trustees and
asset managers in future.
Respondents noted that many trustees already engage in direct dialogue with
asset managers and they anticipated that this trend would grow, albeit at a slow
pace, and that this may dilute the consultants’ control over the investment strategy. 
“Trustees and employers feel that they have to liaise with too many parties and
that advisers are insufficiently accountable for the implementation of the
advice they give.” Asset manager
“We have always wanted to avoid the situation where the consultant acts as
gatekeeper to the scheme and that status is finally being eroded.” Asset manager
“Asset managers are already approaching trustees directly – they are rebadging
their services.Manager of managers already incorporates a consultancy
element.” Consultant
“The rationale of the managers is that if they can forge a strong relationship
with the funds it might help them to either get on the short list for upcoming
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mandates – even if the scheme investment consultant would not normally put
them up for such a mandate – and it might give them a head start when it
comes to the beauty parade. Managers might also believe that direct contact
with funds will allow them to circumvent the whole beauty parade process but
I think this is unlikely.” Asset manager
“Investment consultancy is being broken up post Myners, so that actuarial 
and investment are separate.Within investment, asset allocation and manager
selection are also being separated.Once the asset allocation is decided the
manager can go direct to the trustees.Where asset managers get involved in
asset allocation they may be conflicted – for example, they get much higher
fees on the active equity portfolio than on passive and on fixed interest.”
Consultant
“Most asset managers would like to form some sort of direct relationship 
with the pension funds that they are targeting,while at the same time
recognise the need to remain on good terms with the consultants to these
schemes.” Asset manager
4.6 Asset managers and consultants need to address changing relationship
In some cases, it was clear that the asset managers and consultants do not always
see eye-to-eye. Some respondents also noted that as investment becomes more
liability focused investment banks would have a greater role to play and were
taking on actuaries to provide a broader service to pension schemes.
“Asset managers don’t necessarily understand the liabilities and commitments
– only the actuary can bring that information to the table.The investment
consultant is independent and has no interest in which managers are
appointed.” Consultant
“Consultants say asset managers cannot be impartial but many of the
consultants now offer a manager of managers service so this point must 
also apply to them.” Asset manager
“We will certainly see more of the banks in this arena – they pose the greatest
threat to consultants, as they are hiring actuaries to offer competing services.”
Consultant
“Investment banks represent the biggest competition to consultants and will
become more influential over the next five years, offering swaps and derivative
solutions to pension scheme problems.A lot of asset managers are also taking
on actuaries and building their resources so they can offer asset-liability
modelling,manager of managers solutions, and liability-driven investment.”
Asset manager
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Section 5: Clearance procedures
The Regulator’s Clearance procedures are likely to favour trustees but may
create problems for employers.
The Pensions Regulator runs a clearance procedure whereby companies that
engage in corporate finance transactions that could be construed as counter to 
the interests of the pension scheme members – for example transferring assets 
that could be used to fund the scheme – can apply for a ruling from the Regulator.
The purpose of the ruling is to confirm the Regulator’s opinion that the transaction
is for bona fide purposes and is not detrimental to the strength of the covenant
and the position of trustees as unsecured creditors. In the absence of this
clearance, companies could find transactions challenged after the fact and 
parties to them may become liable to support pension schemes in deficit. 
What the Act says:
38 Contribution notices where avoidance of employer debt
The Regulator may issue a notice to a person stating that the person is under 
a liability to pay the sum specified in the contribution notice either to the trustees 
of the scheme or to the Board of the PPF, where the PPF has already assumed
responsibility for the scheme.
The Regulator may issue a contribution notice to a person only if the Regulator 
is of the opinion that the person was party to an act or a failure to act the purpose
of which was to prevent the recovery of all or part of the pension debt that would
otherwise become due from the employer. The person has to have been in the
relevant period either the employer in relation to the scheme or a person
connected with, or an associate of, the employer.
42 Section 38 contribution notice: clearance statements
An application may be made to the Regulator for the issue of a clearance
statement. A clearance statement is a statement made by the Regulator that, in its
opinion in the circumstances described in the application, the applicant would not
be for the purposes of Section 38 a party to an act or failure to act and that it
would not be reasonable to impose a liability on the applicant under a
contribution notice. 
Where an application is made for clearance, the Regulator may request further
information from the applicant and may invite the applicant to modify the
circumstances described.
A clearance statement binds the Regulator in relation to the exercise of the power
to issue a contribution notice unless the circumstances that give rise to the exercise
of the power to issue a contribution notice are materially different to the
circumstances described in the application.
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5.1 FRS17 funding appears to be a prerequisite for clearance
Full funding on an FRS17 was widely considered to be the key benchmark the
Regulator is using at present to determine clearance applications. Respondents
said this raised serious concerns about the Regulator’s power to use clearance 
as a means to secure an immediate improvement to scheme funding.
“The Regulator seems to be taking FRS17 solvency as the basis for
negotiation. If a scheme falls below this then the Regulator will use clearance
as an opportunity to force the employer to improve scheme funding.” Pensions
lawyer
“It seems that if there is a deficit on an FRS17 basis then the Regulator is very
interested in the situation and keen to have the scheme looking better after
clearance than before. If there is an FRS17 surplus the Regulator is less
interested.” Insurance company
“It looks like getting to 100% funding on FRS17 will get the Regulator off
your back.” Pensions manager
“The Regulator is using FRS17 as a pragmatic proxy for PPF funding at
present – if you’ve got this it is likely to give you clearance and if you haven’t
you’ll have to get there first. In due course it will move to the PPF funding
level and in most cases this will be higher than FRS17.This will make it
difficult for trustees when they look at prudent funding for SFO – will they
assume that FRS 17 or PPF funding is adequate in general if it is adequate for
clearance?” Consultant
“The Regulator seems to be adopting FRS17 as a de facto minimum funding
rate and this is very questionable. FRS17 is a corporate accounting standard
and a single line in the sand – it was never designed as a de facto minimum.”
Consultant
5.2 Clearance opportunities for trustees
The clearance procedures are regarded as a major change for trustees and one
that is, on balance, positive for them and for scheme members in that trustees can
usually use the process to secure additional funds for the scheme.
“The first question the Regulator will ask is about conflicts – clearance asks if
there are conflicts and it asks if trustees support the corporate activity.” Consultant
“Clearance is a powerful tool with which to enter discussions about
restructuring at an early stage.Historically trustees would never have been
involved in M&A discussions, so this is a huge change in corporate dynamics.”
Investment bank
“[The clearance procedures] will help trustees to help members, particularly 
in getting money into the scheme that might not otherwise have been
contributed by the employer.Employers will have to ‘buy off ’ trustees now
before corporate action.” Consultant
“I think the Regulator has said that in the first 50 cases to come for clearance,
they have improved the position of the trustees in 48 of them.” Insurance company
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5.3 Trustees’ greater involvement in corporate activity
Involvement in the clearance procedure does bring complexity for the trustees, in
terms of analysing the situation and negotiating their position with the company.
“Clearance helps trustees to think of the bigger picture – that is, the welfare of
the company as a whole. In the past they have concentrated on the
contribution rate and investment strategy – often in isolation.Now the future
of the company and the implications of any corporate deals for the covenant
are firmly in their minds.” Consultant
“Initially I thought [the clearance procedures] would be too complicated but
now I think they will be a massive help to trustees.They push trustees to adopt
a formal approach and to seek professional advice.But there will be a big cost
in terms of the need for separate advisers for the trustee and company board,
preparing reports, arbitrating etc.” Accountant
“Employers and trustees need to agree protocols for joint management of the
Regulator and clearance.Trustees and the company need to decide who will
coordinate clearance submission – this could be the accountant or solicitors.
Corporate solicitors will be better than pensions solicitors at this because they
need to understand the business.” Accountant
5.4 Trustees to be party to sensitive information
One key issue surrounding clearance is that trustees will be informed of corporate
activity at an early stage as the employer seeks their agreement as part of the
application for clearance. Respondents stressed that lay trustees must appreciate
the sensitive nature of corporate information, including the risks of falling foul of
the Financial Services Authority rules on insider trading and market abuse. Many
respondents felt that confidentiality agreements were not a guarantee of ensuring
information was kept within the trustee group.
“The Regulator will expect that the company and the trustees will have
discussed the issues before the company applies for clearance.Trustees will be
dragged into non-public transactions.” Pensions manager
“The employer’s biggest concern is confidentiality, as very different parties
(trustees and their advisers) will now be involved in early discussions on
corporate activity.” Investment bank
“The trustees need to be involved at an early stage in corporate activities but
there is a real risk of leakage.” Accountant
“It seems to be manageable but no doubt there will be failures to manage
confidentiality from time to time.Bringing trustees in at an early stage in
restructuring, for example, is a new development, so we don’t really know yet.”
Pensions lawyer
“Trustees need to understand their position on confidentiality under the FSA
rules as well as under the Pensions Act.” Investment bank
“Trustees will have to sign confidentiality agreements – but there has to be
doubt as to whether all lay trustees understand the legal implications.” Trustee
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“It is clear that in many cases the trustees will become insiders.That has to be 
a precursor to the discussions,with everyone made aware of the implications.”
Insurance company
5.5 Clearance introduces risks for employers
The clearance procedures are also regarded as a big change to the corporate
finance landscape and one that will have major implications for companies and
their advisers. The power to issue contribution notices and financial support
directions, in effect to ‘unpick’ transactions that weaken the security of the pension
scheme, creates new risks in corporate finance deals.
“This is the big issue for companies.What is new in this Act is that individuals
can be held personally liable – they can’t hide behind the corporate veil. If the
Regulator decides to go after the company they can also go after the directors.
MDs and FDs could end up losing their personal capital and their house – and
they may not find out they are liable for a non-disclosure for five or ten years –
they could be held to account years after an event in which they may not have
been involved.” Pensions lawyer
“Employers will find life more difficult when doing deals.The debt to the
pension scheme has in the past been regarded as ‘softer’ than any of the other
debts.That seems to have been wrong and the new rules mean the pension
debt will be properly taken into account in any deal.” Trustee
“It’s having a big impact around here.Dealing with the pension scheme has
turned into a prerequisite in any M&A activity and also in transactions such 
as share buybacks. Previously, as long as the buyer and seller were happy,
everything was ok.Now it gets much more attention.” Investment bank
5.6 Full impact of clearance yet to sink in
Several respondents expressed concern that a significant minority of companies
and their advisers had yet to come to terms with the full significance of the Act on
corporate activity.
“Corporate advisers are not necessarily aware of the huge changes that are
taking place and the impact these will have on future activity following the
Act.” Investment bank
“There is a large body of companies out there who are unaware of the 
[clearance] procedures and of the problems that they can get themselves in.” Trustee
5.7 Employers’ initial enthusiasm for clearance waning 
Respondents report mixed reactions to clearance from employers. Companies
were keen to have the assurance that they would not be subject to a subsequent
contribution notice or financial support direction, but less enthusiastic about the
process interfering in their business or requiring accelerated funding for the
pension scheme in order to receive the clearance. Some respondents noted that
after an initial short period of enthusiasm employers are becoming more reticent
to seek clearance.
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“After their initial enthusiasm companies are saying they do not want to go
down that road [clearance] and are willing to take the risk.” Pensions lawyer
“Most of my clients are scared of the Regulator.There’s a lot of anxiety over
clearance and companies feel vulnerable.They want to know whether there is
a downside.” Accountant
“Companies don’t like the concept of clearance.They fear interference in the
way the company runs. In practice its success will depend on the quality of the
Regulator’s staff.” Consultant
“They will perceive clearance as something that gets in the way of doing
business, but it is not intended to assist the company, it is intended to help the
scheme.” Trustee
“Already we are finding that companies prefer taking the risk and are not
going for clearance.The price they have to pay for clearance is faster funding
than they might otherwise have negotiated [with the trustees] and the whole
process could take so long they would lose their competitive advantage in a
corporate action.” Consultant
“Initially employers were quite keen – they thought clearance gave them a
guarantee of safety from further regulatory investigation.Very quickly,
however, employers have become wary.We need to see anonymous case
studies from the Regulator to find out what led to the acceptance or rejection.
We need to know why companies are turned down.” Consultant
5.8 Clearance costs a concern
There was also concern about the costs of clearance.
“In our experience clearance can cost between £50,000 and £100,000 to
cover the legal, actuarial and independent accounting advice. Smaller and
medium sized schemes are going to really struggle with that.” Pensions lawyer
“Employers will need to decide if they really need clearance – there are costs
involved and it is time consuming – but if it turns out after the event that a
sell-off or refinancing did need clearance then they will be in big trouble if it
wasn’t sought.” Pensions lawyer
5.9 Clearance offers no absolute guarantees against future intervention
Further, there was concern that clearance is not an absolute guarantee of
immunity to future action.
“Clearance only provides contingent cover on the basis of information
provided – and the Regulator asks for a short summary, so companies are
strongly discouraged from sending in a huge report.But if they miss anything
out or something emerges several years later then clearance is invalid.”
Pensions lawyer
“If they go for clearance they will be managing a risk but there is no certainty
that the risk is eliminated.” Pensions lawyer
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5.10 The Regulator can pierce the corporate veil – within the EU
One of the most important powers of the Regulator is its ability to assess and hold
responsible for the problems of a single company, the group as a whole and the
parent. However, the Regulator’s powers to pursue money owed by a parent or
group may be limited by geographical and political boundaries.
“The Regulator will not have any problems where it is clear which is the
principal company and in these cases it might be able to secure assets for the
trustees from different companies in the group behind the scenes.But it may
struggle with complicated structures that involve non-UK companies. It will
be difficult to impose contribution notices in these cases.” Consultant
“There is a big question over foreign owned companies. In the EU there is 
the reciprocal cross-border agreement that although not compulsory most
countries have signed up to – the ‘reciprocal enforcement of judgements
convention’.The question though is whether overseas courts will recognise
the liability. Is this a civil debt or a regulatory debt? In general foreign courts
do not enforce foreign regulatory fines or taxes.The jury is out on whether
courts will take any action at all – for example in the US, Japan,China, and
Malaysia.” Pensions lawyer
“The process is designed to look through corporate structures to see who has
accountability. It is important that the Regulator understands the nature of
multinationals. In the case of a US parent, the UK company might look quite
weak – because that is how US companies run the group, repatriating as much
capital as possible to the parent.Trustees also need to understand that if the
company is abandoned by a US parent they are in a potentially weak position.
The Regulator thinks it can slap financial support directions on the overseas
parent.Within the EU that might be possible but it is debatable as to whether
this will succeed where the parent is outside of the EU.” Consultant
5.10 Employers likely to contest the Regulator’s rulings
Furthermore, companies are unlikely to accept the Regulator’s decisions to apply
contribution notices and financial support directions without question.
“Companies will test the Regulator to the limits and will challenge decisions –
it could take five years if it goes to the courts, during which time there will 
be a period of uncertainty.The Regulator has a wide armoury but some
companies will try it on.While the Regulator has very effective resources and
people at present will it be able to maintain these over the longer-term?”
Consultant
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Section 6: Pension Protection Fund 
There are serious doubts over the longer-term viability of the PPF.
The Act creates the Pension Protection Fund, which is designed to underwrite a
proportion of the pension benefits of members of underfunded schemes where the
employer becomes insolvent. Existing pensioners effectively receive their benefits
in full, while non-retired members receive 90% of their benefits up to a cap, which
is currently set at £25,000 per annum.
Respondents generally welcomed the concept of the PPF. Some also noted that it
was a politically astute move on the part of the government.
“The idea of PPF looked good on the front page of the Daily Mail. Somehow
it has got to be made to work.” Trustee
The scheme members we spoke to also thought the PPF was a valuable protection
and one they would, within reason, pay for.
“It wouldn’t be a bad thing, knowing that what I have saved is protected.”
DB scheme member
‘It’s a belt and braces approach.” DB scheme member
“It does give you confidence.” DB scheme member
6.1 Will the PPF have to cut benefits and/or increase the levy?
However, most of our professional respondents were sceptical that it could work
beyond the short term, at least as currently structured. On this point almost all
respondents were concerned that the PPF is too ambitious and must either cut the
benefits it offers to scheme members or increase the levy it charges to schemes;
probably both. Respondents agreed that the PPF could survive over the short and
medium term as it is currently financed but as schemes close, mature, and wind 
up the ‘tax base’ for the levy will shrink and the government and taxpayer will be
forced to address controversial questions. 
“It’s a short-term fix and that’s welcome. In the long term the PPF is unstable.
It faces a diminishing taxable franchise – that is, the number of available
scheme to levy will fall – and a rising liability.” Pensions lawyer
“In the short term the PPF will work, yes – say the next 5-10 years. In the very
long term it will have no more DB schemes left to cover, so its role is finite,
albeit lasting many decades.” Consultant to SMEs
“The worry I have is that at some stage the PPF will run into funding
difficulties.That’s not an ‘if ’, it’s a given.At this point the PPF will have to
increase the levy or reduce benefits, or the government will have to step in.
Once the future of the PPF becomes a political issue governments will be
reluctant to face it openly and will be inclined to let the problem build up
behind the scenes.The situation will get worse and worse until it is too late to
save it.” Consultant
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6.2 PPF exposed to uncontrollable risk in the event of an economic downturn
In the longer term, the PPF’s viability will depend largely on the state of the
economy.
“Beyond year ten it will start to get tricky – if not before – because it will be
swamped.PPF is so dependent on the economy – if we move into a downturn
within the next five years then the PPF is going to be in big trouble because a
lot of companies will go bust before they’ve had time to meet the recovery
plan. If we go into a recession the PPF will be in danger of collapse – it will be
forced into an increasingly unsustainable actuarial position.” Consultant to SMEs
“The PPF is not a sound proposition – it depends on demand and that
depends on the economy.This is the real moral hazard – it’s beyond the control
of politicians, employers and schemes, as well as the Regulator and PPF.
Tensions will rapidly emerge between the Regulator’s desire for aggressive
gung-ho negotiations on the part of trustees with the employer and for trustee
prudence in the investment strategy.” Consultant
“The PPF is a political construct. It was not established as a life office and not
established as a DB pension fund, but rather something in between. It is a
fudge.There is a serious risk that the PPF will get into financial difficulties
because it is a fudge.They have tried to balance the demands for protection
with the concerns that employers will have to pay for it.” Insurance company
Only a small minority of respondents thought there was a long-term future 
for PPF.
“There is no reason why it cannot work and the comparisons with the US are
misleading.We don’t have an equivalent of Chapter 11 and so liquidation in
the UK is a step taken much less lightly.Also the premiums for the PBGC have
to be approved by Congress, so they are not really risk based and they can’t be
changed easily.A better parallel is the mutual insurance arrangement in place
in Germany for the book reserve system.There have been some big corporate
failures, but the system has coped without undue difficulty.” Trustee
6.3 PPF levy forces stronger employers to subsidise the weak
A key issue for many respondents was the effective cross-subsidy from well run
schemes to weak or failing ones.
“Big plcs are very angry because they are picking up the can for disreputable
companies – they are now having to pay the levy to bail out the rest.” Accountant
“The PPF is just a mechanism to transfer risk.You can move risk around and
you can share it but you can’t bring down the total level.” Asset manager
“In theory the PPF can meet its objectives but this is political.The
government has effectively given the PPF the power of taxation.” Consultant
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6.4 Will larger schemes move offshore?
Some respondents thought that larger, well-funded schemes would take action 
to avoid the levy. 
“The PPF is about politics, not pensions but it is still worthwhile. In theory,
yes, it can meet its objectives, as it has the power to raise levies.But this is
politically unsustainable and will impose an unacceptable cost on ongoing
schemes.We will see schemes setting up outside the UK to avoid the levy.This
is already being considered.Employers will close the final salary scheme and
set up a new scheme for future accrual elsewhere. PPF covers registered UK
schemes only – so it would not cover a pan-European scheme established in
Ireland, for example, even if it had UK members.” Consultant
“The big multinationals will take their schemes offshore and avoid the levy.
The forthcoming European directive says that a pension scheme can be in any
EU country and still receive tax relief.No big scheme has moved out of the
UK yet but it’s going to happen.” Pensions lawyer
6.5 PPF compensation too high?
The two interrelated issues here are how much the PPF should pay as
compensation – and most respondents felt that the cap at £25,000 was too high –
and the amount of the levy that schemes of solvent employers pay to fund the PPF.
Most respondents thought the total levy would turn out to be significantly higher
than the initial indications of £300m per year.
“The Government is calling it an insurance scheme.During the parliamentary
process they were fond of using the word “guarantee”– which is actively
misleading.There is a power in the Act for the secretary of state to reduce the
benefits if the fund hits financial difficulties.” Insurance company
“The monetary limits will have to come down or the levy be increased
substantially.” Consultant
“£25k is too high – it will need at least £500m per annum to meet its
liabilities and again it depends so much on the economy as to how pressed it
becomes.” Consultant to SMEs
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What the Act says:
175 Pension Protection Levies
Each year the Board of the Pension Protection Fund must impose a risk-based
pension protection levy and a scheme-based pension protection levy in respect 
of all eligible schemes. The risk-based levy must make up at least 80% of the total
amount raised.
A risk-based pension protection levy is assessed by reference to:
· the difference between the value of the scheme assets and its protected liabilities
· the likelihood of an insolvency event occurring to the employer 
The Board may also take account of the risks associated with the nature of the
scheme’s investments when compared to the nature of its liabilities.
A scheme-based pension protection levy is assessed by reference to the amount 
of the scheme’s liabilities to members
The Board may also take account of the number of persons who are members 
of the scheme and the total amount of pensionable earnings of active members 
of the scheme.
178 The levy ceiling
The Secretary of State must, before the beginning of each financial year after 
the initial year for which levies are required to be imposed, specify by order the
amount which is to be the levy ceiling for that year. For the first year the Treasury
must approve this ceiling. For subsequent years the ceiling amount can be
increased in line with aggregate earnings. Increases greater than this require 
the approval of the Treasury.
The PPF has published an estimate of £300m for the 2006/07 total levy, but more
recently has acknowledged that other commentators estimate higher amounts.
6.6 Concern over PPF investment strategy
Some respondents noted that it would be ironic if an underfunded PPF were forced
to ‘bet’ on investment returns to meet its financial needs.
“It depends on the levy ceiling – this needs to be more realistic. Like any
pension scheme PPF has two sources of income to pay benefits – the levy and
investment returns.There will be serious problems if PPF is forced to depend
too heavily on the investment strategy.” Investment bank
“If it doesn’t get enough money through the levy it will have to adopt a more
aggressive investment strategy – the very position that DB schemes are in
regarding the contribution/investment strategy balance.” Consultant to SMEs
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6.7 Political debate over levy and benefits ahead
Having introduced a comparatively low levy and high benefit guarantee it will be
hard for the government to make any significant changes without undermining
confidence in the PPF. All of the options bring political problems.
“The government has got to make it work – even if this means providing
financial support.Otherwise there will be no confidence in DB at all.This will
put the government in a tough position, as it has tried to distance itself from
backing DB promises.” Consultant to SMEs
“Although the PPF can reduce benefits marginally, if a significant reduction is
necessary it will have to be the Secretary of State for Pensions who takes this
step so it will be a high profile political move.” Consultant
6.8 Regulator as gateway to the PPF
The Regulator has an important role to play in improving pension scheme funding
and as a result reducing calls on the PPF.
“The Regulator is the gateway to PPF, therefore the success or otherwise of
the PPF will depend on how that gateway is policed.The Regulator has to get
money out of companies before the scheme goes to the PPF.” Accountant
“I’m not convinced about the success of the PPF. It depends on how tough the
Regulator is in getting employers to correct deficits on a PPF basis.” Investment bank
6.9 Jobs vs. Pensions
Where an employer is in a weak financial position, it may be that it is unable to
afford to fund the pension scheme deficit. At the extreme, requiring it to make
good the deficit could force the employer into insolvency, costing current
employees their jobs. The Regulator therefore faces a difficult balancing act
between improving scheme funding and avoiding damaging going concern
businesses.
We encountered very mixed views over the extent to which the Regulator and the
PPF should take jobs into account. All respondents recognised that the Regulator
did take jobs into account with approximately half suggesting that jobs should be
very secondary to pensions, while the other half felt that they should be of broadly
equal weighting because ‘jobs’ are synonymous with company solvency and
without this the scheme would fall into the PPF. 
“The Regulator will face situations where it has to decide whether to impose
a level of contributions on the employer that may force the company into
insolvency or to let the company continue at a lower contribution rate,
knowing that it could still go bust and that this would land the PPF with an
even bigger debt.” Consultant
“It’s not so much jobs as company solvency. If the company goes bust the
scheme falls into the PPF. It’s hard to see how the Regulator will balance these
two but under the legislation the clear priority is pensions.” Pensions lawyer
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“This is a very subjective issue.The best outcome could be to dilute pensions
and protect jobs.” Consultant
“It’s difficult – members age 29 will want job security,members age 59 will
want pension security.” Consultant
“Yes, the Regulator must be interested in saving the employer – it must do 
all it can to keep the employer in business.This is the only hope of meeting
scheme liabilities outside of the PPF.” Consultant to SMEs
“There’s no doubt that the Regulator is taking account of jobs.However, if
this is the right approach,will the Regulator be even-handed or will it be
under pressure to underpin companies that are large, high profile and have an
active and vocal union?” Consultant
“The Regulator will have to avoid the Siren sound of job protection and
ensure that shareholders do pay up when this is required.Otherwise
companies will fold and shed liabilities and set up in a new guise – they will
buy the assets and re-employ a reduced labour force.” Consultant
6.10 State interference in the market economy?
Several respondents were concerned about the recent decision of the PPF to accept
the pension liabilities of the insolvent insurance broker Heath Lambert in return 
for 10% of the equity of the new restructured group, Heath Lambert Holdings. 
The company argued that the deal allowed the business to be recapitalised and
without new capital the pension liabilities would have fallen on PPF in any case.
Our respondents argued that this is tantamount to state interference in the free
market and would distort competition.
“The problem is how to go forward.The Heath Lambert precedent is a major
concern.Will the Regulator’s action give Heath Lambert a competitive edge –
will competitors object?” Investment bank
“The pensions and jobs approach is politically driven and the PPF levy will
force schemes to underwrite the jobs of competitors, as in Heath Lambert.”
Trustee
“The regulation does refer to jobs – the wording is ‘having regard for jobs’ –
but the Regulator says that this is a secondary interest.Having said that,
in practice it may act in favour of jobs – the Heath Lambert case being an
example.This has set an awkward precedent and competitors of Heath
Lambert understandably have complained that they could be at a
disadvantage.” Pensions lawyer
“Why should a well-funded scheme have to pay a levy to support lesser-
funded schemes and to perpetuate jobs in what is possibly a competitor
company? This is politically motivated. Savings jobs is a legitimate objective,
but should be funded by the taxpayer not by pension schemes.” Trustee
“This is an attempt to solve the country’s economic problems through pension
schemes.The focus clearly should be pensions. Should jobs be protected in
uncompetitive companies? This is quasi-state interference with the market
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economy – similar to what happened with the airlines and steel companies 
in the US.Pensions have become confused with political and social issues.”
Consultant
It remains to be seen whether taking equity stakes as a part of recapitalising
businesses will be a standard approach for the PPF, or whether the circumstances
of Heath Lambert render it a one off. 
Section 7: Employer commitment to pensions 
Employers feel they have lost control of their DB schemes and will close to
future accrual. They will lose their commitment to trust-based pensions. 
There was near consensus amongst respondents that the changes introduced 
by the Act were viewed negatively by corporate sponsors and that closure of 
DB schemes to future accrual was very much on the agenda. Some noted that 
this decision would be driven by financial necessity rather than HR policy.
Respondents told us that employers and advisers believe that the legislation has
converted what was originally a flexible and voluntary employer promise, where
benefits could be reduced if necessary to accommodate economic conditions, to 
a legal guarantee. Companies that started their DB schemes with good intentions
would never have done so if they knew they would be locked in to the guarantees
the government now demands.
“Employers already felt they had lost control over advisers and the investment
strategy under the 1995 Act, now they feel they have lost control over the
contribution rate.” Consultant
“Increasingly employers are being forced into an unfair position.They set up
schemes in the past on a voluntary basis and between the 1995 and 2004 Acts
they have been compelled to cede control of trustee boards to MNTs.”
Consultant
“Employers certainly regard final salary schemes as risky but then business 
is all about risk.The biggest problem for employers is that the DB risk is
unpredictable – increased risk comes out of the blue due to government
changes in legislation and regulation.” Consultant 
“Employers say they are losing their power to manage pension schemes that
they started as a voluntary arrangement – because the government has
changed the rules.” Accountant
“Legislation has forced them to turn a promise into a guarantee.A promise
assumes you will do your best to meet it – a guarantee insists – hence the need
to set aside assets now and over a very short period to reach solvency.” Trustee
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7.1 Closure will be a response to short recovery periods
Most respondents regarded the closure of DB schemes to future accrual as an
inevitable consequence of the existing deficits and the new rules that require the
deficits to be recovered over relatively short time periods.
“We are already seeing more companies closing to future accrual as a result 
of the Act.” Consultant
“Employers want out.They know they have to close their DB schemes and 
no one can fault them for this.” Asset manager
“Many would like to get out of DB pensions altogether and will do so if they
possibly can.” Investment bank
While closure to new employees was a relatively easy step for many companies,
stopping future accrual for existing members was thought to be a more difficult
labour-relations exercise. Nonetheless, most respondents still thought that it 
would happen in due course.
“Closure to future accrual has to be the next step. I’m surprised that hasn’t
happened more already.But, it is understandable that there is some reluctance
to take a benefit away from current employees who already have it.”
Insurance company
7.2 DB scheme management has become a finance rather than HR function
Some respondents noted that management of the DB scheme was no longer 
an issue about employee benefits, but rather an exercise in financial risk
management.
“The driving seat on benefits is switching from the HRD to the FD.
Closure of DB scheme and the management of the deficit have become
technical finance issues and nothing to do with benefits.” Consultant
“Companies no longer see the DB scheme as part of the HR strategy but
rather they regard it as a financial liability.These days it’s the finance director
rather than the HR director who worries about pensions.” Consultant
“Employers see the DB scheme as a debt to be sorted out under regulatory
pressure.” Investment bank
7.3 Legacy DB seen as a competitive disadvantage
Others suggested it was also an issue of competitive advantage within certain
industrial sectors. Companies with legacy DB arrangements were thought to be 
at a disadvantage relative to newer competitors without these liabilities.
“Companies with DB schemes are looking longingly at competitors that
never went there.Think about BA and its low-cost competitors.” Consultant
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7.4 Pension guarantees can only be offered at a low level
A key point raised by several respondents was that the government had failed to
understand the fundamental difference between a voluntary pension promise,
where discretion could be used to adjust benefits in the light of both positive and
adverse economic conditions, and a legal guarantee. If the government wants
employers to provide legal guarantees the value of pensions would have to be
reduced in future or, alternatively, employers would avoid them altogether by a
switch to DC.
“Members may have to accept a lower level of benefits if these are to be
guaranteed.” Investment bank
“The danger is that solvency requirements that enhance security for existing
DB members might perhaps bring an end to DB provision.As companies are
forced to improve the funding of existing arrangements,more of them will say
‘that’s the end’.” Pensions manager
“DB schemes face a less certain future under the Pensions Act.The Act
strengthens the benefits of members but at the same time weakens the shelf life
of the scheme.” Consultant
“The Act may make pensions more secure for individuals but if it leads to the
destruction of workplace pensions then the collective will suffer.” Pensions lawyer
“The Act improves pension security for members if they are in DB. If they are
not in DB the Act kills any chance of this ever being offered.” Consultant
“There is no point in having the best regulation in the world if there are no
schemes left to regulate.” Pensions lawyer
7.5 DB schemes of SMEs will be the first casualty 
The unanimous view of respondents was that smaller companies would not be
able to accommodate the requirements of the Act and would be forced to close
their DB schemes and to wind up as soon as possible. However, some respondents
felt that this was an appropriate response and that DB is no longer an efficient 
and cost-effective benefit for most SMEs.
“In theory the Act does recognise the needs of smaller companies – there is a
proportionality requirement, an overriding caveat that recognises the smaller
resources available to SMEs.What we don’t know is whether the Regulator
will recognise this in practice.” Pensions lawyer
“SMEs in particular will have problems with TKU – they shouldn’t be in the
DB game and it will become necessary to manage their exit from it.” Consultant
“The enhanced security conferred by the act comes at a price and this will be
too high for many SMEs.” Consultant
“There are issues around very small schemes. In some cases people wear three
hats, as employer, trustee and member. In these cases the Regulator could well
say ‘on your own head be it.’ But, other small schemes have members who are
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not the employer or trustees and they could be disadvantaged if the trustees
fail to act properly.The case for exemptions is less clear here and if things go
wrong the members could legitimately complain that the legal requirements
(TKU) were not met.” Insurance company
7.6 Deferred compensation still relevant
Most respondents acknowledged that, while DB schemes were likely to close to
future accrual, employers will find they still need to offer deferred benefits of some
sort in order to instil ‘loyalty’ in key employees. 
“In future it will be important for FDs and HRDs to meet each other half way
– for FDs to understand the importance of the benefits package in long-term
recruitment and retention policy but HRDs have to understand the financial
implications of their strategy.” Consultant
“In the long-term companies will find that they have to retain attractive
pension schemes in order to attract the right people.Cash does not encourage
loyalty. Pensions are a more subtle retention tool.” Consultant
7.7 DB and other risk sharing suitable only for very large employers
Larger companies may have the option to maintain a DB scheme but they may
also look at risk-sharing alternatives to final salary and at ‘flexible benefits’ 
where the annual cash commitment is tightly controlled.
“Big companies have other options – for example career average or a hybrid
DB/DC scheme.The point here is that pensions must remain on the benefits
list – large companies have to have a pension scheme as part of their HR
strategy. It will not be easy for large high profile companies with a vocal union
to close to future accrual and switch to contract DC.” Consultant
“The benefits to an employer of having a DB scheme are unchanged from 10
or 20 years ago, but the risks and costs are much greater now.This could mean
the end of DB,but it doesn’t necessarily.What is required is more thought on
appropriate ways of sharing risk between the employer and the employees.”
Trustee
7.8 Rapid scheme restructuring ahead
Some respondents argued that the tight timetable for deficit recovery implied 
by the Act would force companies to move quickly to restructure their pension
arrangements and as a result some risk-sharing approaches, such as hybrid 
or cash balance pension schemes, would not be considered.
“Most companies would have tried to find an alternative – by reducing the
accrual rate or raising the normal pension age, for example. PA04 is forcing
quick closure and has left no time for restructuring the DB benefits.” Pensions
lawyer
“DB is a great way to share very complex and nasty risks that most individuals
are not able to deal with.The Act is forcing companies to move quickly and as
a result they are going straight to DC,whereas, if they had more time, they
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would consider other risk-sharing structures such as career average and cash
balance.Most companies have lost the opportunity to explore this middle
ground.” Asset manager
7.9 Continued shift to DC inevitable
Most respondents thought that occupational pension provision would ultimately
shift to a DC basis for both new and existing employees. However, several
respondents noted that the move to DC had dangers, particularly in terms of
possible under provision of pension benefits from low contribution rates.
“In time everyone will be in DC as schemes close to future accrual.
Companies will be under pressure to do this, as to run a two-tier workforce
makes no sense because DC members will demand higher salaries. It will be
easier for employers to switch everyone to DC for future service.” Consultant
“Employers will have to move to DC but will do so with the nagging doubt
that this is not the right way forwards in the long term. Asset manager
“It’s unlikely DC will work – that is, provide sufficient pensions.When these
chickens come hope to roost employers will face significant difficulties.”
Asset manager
7.10 Occupational DC losing ground 
DC imposes the investment and longevity risk on individual members. The role 
of the trustee board in occupational DC provides an important element of
governance that is absent in contract-based DC, as the NAPF pointed out in its
report ‘Pensions Scheme Governance – fit for the 21st century?’ (www.napf.co.uk). 
Respondents thought that following the Act, many employers that close their DB
arrangements will wish to avoid any further implications of trust-based pension
arrangements, while those with occupational DC schemes will move to a contract
basis. The life offices in the pensions market are already gearing up for this
eventuality and several have launched specific DC-to-DC services in addition to
their DB-to-DC conversions. The larger ‘corporate’ independent advisers are
doing the same. The apparent attraction of contract DC is that the life office is
responsible for the governance, administration, and investment functions. This
formally separates pensions and jobs. However, as the NAPF observed, the
absence of a body responsible for looking after members’ interests means that
‘there is no effective mechanism to promote or represent the collective interests of
scheme members’.
“Any small or medium sized company starting with a clean sheet will have to
think very carefully before going down the route of occupational money
purchase.” Insurance company
“Contract arrangements are likely to be preferred over occupational money
purchase because of the administrative complexity of the latter. Even where
the same requirements apply to both forms, in contract schemes the
requirements can be dealt with by the provider,which has economies of scale.”
Insurance company
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“Occupational DC schemes are being wound up because the governance is
much tougher than for contract DC – for example they need annual audits
and trustee requirements.This is a loss to the pension system.Stakeholder
schemes and group personal pensions are not capable of being audited – there
is no member level information held by the employer, no way of checking the
insurance company guarantee that contributions have gone to the right
place”. Trustee
“Occupational DC was a way of offering something by way of compensation
when the DB scheme closed.There is a strong move to contract based schemes
and even to cash options (that is pay rather than pension).This is employers on
the way out from pension provision.” Trustee
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Conclusion
Our report aims to reflect the genuine concerns of the many parties to
occupational pension schemes in the UK. We have found that those responsible
for running the schemes – both sponsors and advisers – are deeply concerned that
the Pensions Act 2004 imposes an unacceptable burden on companies that
currently provide DB pension schemes. Employers are feeling alienated from
policy decisions that have a direct impact on their costs, their risks, and the way
they do business.
To proceed with confidence employers need the flexibility to design benefits that
are appropriate to their size and financial strength. Employers feel that the
Pensions Act 2004, in effect, removes much of the flexibility they need in order to
design appropriate employee benefits. The Act raises the risks associated with DB
pension provision to a level that exceeds the perceived benefits.
The government has stated in the past that it aims to shift the balance between
state and private pension provision from 60:40 to 40:60 by 2050. The possible
unintended consequence of the Act is that measures designed to shore up the
occupational pensions sector seriously risk undermining it and hastening its
demise. This is the Pyrrhic victory of our title. 
At present employers have the right to close defined benefit schemes and to switch
to defined contribution arrangements that pose many more questions for
retirement policy than DB. In our earlier report, ‘Delivering DC? Barriers to
participation in the company sponsored pensions market’ (October 2004), we
noted that financial institutions and advisers are withdrawing from the SME sector,
particularly where the workforce profile is one of lower to average earners. The
earlier report shows that providers and advisers are finding it increasingly
uneconomic to market to these companies. This is an important and difficult issue
for both the government and the private sector providers.
With the concerns expressed in this second report about the potential demise of
DB in all but the largest companies and the inadequate ability of individuals to
bear the investment and longevity risk for retirement provision, DC may prove to
be a blunt instrument with which to deliver the government’s policy objectives.
The Pensions Commission publishes its final report and recommendations later
this year and will offer the government guidance on how to improve overall
pension provision. The occupational pensions sector is likely to have an important
role to play in those improvements. We hope our report has managed to highlight
some of the very difficult issues that exist in that area.
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